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I. MR. REESE'S CLAIM THAT LWP DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A 
MEDIATION AND IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY WAS NOT PRESERVED 
BELOW AND IS THEREFORE WAIVED BY MR. REESE.1 
Mr. Reese's argument that LWP Solutions, Inc. ("LWP") did not participate in a 
mediation with Mr. Reese and therefore is not entitled to the protections of confidentiality 
given to mediation discussions was not raised before the trial court and it is therefore 
waived. "As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown, 
856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Sweet v. Sweet 138 P.3d 63, 64 fh2 (Utah 
App.2006). 
Here, Mr. Reese has not alleged plain error or exceptional circumstances, and the 
Court should decline to address Mr. Reese's argument that LWP and Mr. Reese were not 
participating in a mediation at the time that he alleges an oral agreement was reached 
because this issue was not raised below. In fact, the plain language of Mr. Reese's 
arguments to the trial court belie his claims. In the affidavit submitted by Mr. Henriksen 
in support of his Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Mr. Henriksen noted that 
1
 As was the case in Mr. Reese's opposition to LWP Solutions, Inc.'s to Motion for Discretionary Interlocutory 
Appeal, Mr. Reese and his counsel utilize derogatory and improper language in its brief, which LWP asks the court 
to ignore. For example, Mr. Reese uses language such as "fabricate," "grossly misinterprets," "falsely," 
"exaggerate," "twisted," "conceal," and "misinterpret." Also, the use of the phrase "Welch" as reference to the 
alleged failure of LWP to adhere to some imagined agreement is a racially prejudicial statement. The use of the 
phrase "to Welch" originated in the early 19th Century when the English government decided that all Welsh children 
should speak English in school. Any child caught speaking Welsh had a board place around his/her neck and could 
only get rid of it by "telling on" another child who was using Welsh. "Welshing" came to be used to describe a 
person who was a "traitor." See http://www.rsdb.org. However, it is clear that it is a racial slur that this Court 
should not adopt in any of its published opinions. 
1 
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"[alt the mediation conference the parties reached an agreement for the resolution of all 
issues in the case, including the subrogation interest of LWP." R69 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Henriksen also admitted that Ms. Acosta, as counsel for LWP, was present during the 
mediation. R69. In the Motion itself, Mr. Reese admitted that LWP participated in the 
mediation. R55-56. Mr. Reese stated "[during the mediation it came to that point and 
the Plaintiffs counsel asked LWP to compromise the amount of the lien" so the case 
could settle. R56 (emphasis added). Mr. Reese also made representations to the trial 
court such as "later in the mediation" and "[t]he mediation, therefore, concluded because 
all three parties reached this satisfactory agreement." R57. 
In no uncertain terms, Mr. Reese took the position at the trial court level that LWP 
participated in the mediation and that any alleged agreement between LWP and Mr. 
Reese was reached during such mediation. Mr. Reese cannot now take the contrary 
position. He did not preserve at the trial court level his argument that he and LWP were 
not participating in a mediation at the time the alleged agreement was reached. 
LWP does note that Mr. Reese has revealed the weaknesses of his own position by 
attempting to switch defenses on appeal. Rather than seek to distinguish the case law, 
rules and statutes proposed by LWP, Mr. Reese seeks to side-step their application. See 
Opposition at page 18 (where Mr. Reese argues lhat the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lb-8, B, Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999) and Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute 
Resolution do not apply). By his own actions, Mr. Reese acknowledges that he has no 
real defense to the fact that all mediation discussions are confidential. 
1
 2 ' . • 
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Furthermore, Mr. Reese's own actions at the mediation itself belie his claim that 
LWP was not a participant in the mediation. For example, LWP was addiessed by the 
mediator during the initial "joint session" of the mediation where the ground rules of the 
mediation were set forth by the mediator. LWP was asked to meet with and discuss the 
case with the mediator alone, the mediator and the plaintiff, and the mediator and Tingey 
Construction. LWP was identified on the proposed Memorandum of Understanding and 
was asked by Mr. Reese to execute this document. These facts are conclusive evidence 
that LWP was a participant in the mediation (even if it was not a party to the underlying 
legal action) and that all participants at the mediation (including Mr. Reese) treated LWP 
as a participant. 
If new evidence were allowed, LWP would introduce evidence which would show 
that LWP participated in the mediation because it believed that it was entitled to the 
benefits and limitations of mediation and would not have participated otherwise. Mr. 
Reese did not argue to the trial court that LWP was not participating in the mediation and 
as a consequence, LWP was deprived of its due process right to introduce evidence to 
rebut this claim. It is for precisely this reason that appellate courts refuse to hear issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
In short, Mr. Reese's argument that LWP was not a participant in the mediation 
was not preserved in the trial court and is therefore waived. The Court should disregard 
all arguments asserted by Mr. Reese which attempt to argue that LWP was not a 
participant in the mediation and is not entitled to the benefits of confidentiality. 
3 
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II. MR. REESE MISCHARACTERIZES SEVERAL FACTS IN HIS 
RECITATION OF THE FACTS WHICH LWP CAN REBUT. 
LWP would first like to point out the difficult position in which it finds itself. 
LWP believes in the force and benefit of mediation and believes that the only way in 
which mediation will continue to prosper is if confidentiality of the mediation process is 
preserved. However, Mr. Reese has made several statements in his Opposition that are 
inaccurate, incomplete and misleading. LWP will attempt to rebut and respond to these 
statements without breaching the confidentiality of the mediation process. Any statement 
by LWP in its response should not be viewed by this Court as a waiver of the 
confidentiality of the mediation discussions between LWP and Mr. Reese. That LWP is 
in this unusual predicament is further evidence of why alleged oral agreements reached 
during mediation should not be allowed. The Uniform Mediation Act which Utah 
adopted on May 1, 2006 and the Court-Annexed Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
all require that agreements reached during mediation be reduced to writing so as to avoid 
the exact situation in which LWP finds itself here. 
A. The Trial Court Delayed in Allowing LWP to Intervene, Causing 
Procedural Problems. 
At page 7 of it Opposition to LWP's brief in support of its appeal, Mr. Reese states 
that LWP "addresses [itself] as an intervening party without authority to do so." Mr. 
Rees touts this fact as evidence that LWP was being dishonest with the trial court. 
What Mr. Reese fails to mention is that when LWP filed a proposed order with the 
court it simultaneously filed a motion to intervene. R135. LWP had expected that the 
trial court would recognize the procedural problems faced by LWP because it was subject 
4 
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to the trial court's order but, as a non-party, was not in a position to appeal the ruling. 
LWP simultaneously filed the motion to intervene with the expectation that the trial court 
would grant the motion to intervene prior to issuing an order binding LWP to produce its 
counsel for deposition. R135. Unfortunately, the trial court made the subsequent 
procedural error of executing an order directing LWP to produce its counsel without first 
allowing LWP to intervene. R179, 197. 
As this Court is aware, LWP was left in a procedural quagmire and was forced to 
concurrently file a motion for discretionary interlocutory appeal and a petition for an 
extraordinary writ. R195, 196. LWP sought the extraordinary writ because, as a non 
party, it did not have standing to appeal the trial court's ruling that it should produce its 
counsel for deposition regarding the confidential mediation discussions. R195. Over 
Mr. Reese's objections, LWP was allowed to intervene in the suit and then this Court 
granted its petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal. R157, 197, 205. Mr. Reese's 
comment at page 7 of his opposition that LWP wrongfully identified itself as an 
intervening party in its proposed order is, at best, a half truth and obviously does not fully 
explain to the Court the procedural history of the suit. LWP intended that the trial court 
allow it to intervene prior to executing its proposed order. The trial court did not do this. 
Mr. Reese's attempt to point to this fact as evidence of LWP's deceptive tactics fails 
miserably. 
Next, at page 8, Mr. Reese disparages LWP for waiting until June 29, 2006 (the 
day before LWP's counsel was to be deposed) to file its motion to quash the deposition 
5 
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notice and to file its motions for discretionary appeal and motion for extraordinary writ. 
R185. Again, Mr. Reese deletes important facts that make LWP's behavior reasonable. 
Mr. Reese issued a faulty Notice of Deposition on June 22, 2006. (See Motion to 
Quash Deposition at page 185 of the record for a discussion of the deficiencies of this 
notice). The trial court did not execute an order directing LWP to produce its counsel for 
deposition until June 26, 2006. R179. As noted above, this order did not address the 
issue of whether LWP would be allowed to intervene in the suit even though it directed 
LWP to produce its counsel for deposition. R179. In its Motion to Quash Notice of 
Deposition of S. Grace Acosta, LWP informed the trial court (yet again) that it had not 
been allowed to intervene in the suit and that procedurally it was being disadvantaged by 
the trial court's failure to allow it to intervene.2 Rl85. 
The trial court did not allow LWP to intervene in the suit until July 10, 2006, after 
LWP had filed its motion for discretionary appeal, after it had filed its petition for 
extraordinary relief and after the date for Ms. Acosta's deposition had run. R197. What 
Mr. Reese fails to acknowledge is that LWP waited until the day before Ms. Acosta's 
deposition to file its motion to quash because it wasn't until that date that LWP knew that 
the Court would not rule on its motion to intervene until after the deposition date. Mr. 
LWP believed that it could not file an Appellate Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary 
Appeal until the trial court allowed it to intervene in the suit. In order to preserve its 
arguments for appeal, LWP filed concurrent Rule 8 Motions for Extraordinary Writ and a 
Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary Writ. This court denied the Rule 8 Extraordinary Writ 
and noted in its ruling that LWP had the ability to protect itself by proceeding with its 
already filed Rule 5 Petition for Discretionary Appeal. LWP also filed the Motion to 
Quash the Notice of Deposition for Ms. Acosta concurrently with a motion to stay the 
proceedings during pendency of appeal. LWP was forced to file both the motion to quash 
and the motion to stay to ensure that the deposition of Ms. Acosta did not take place. 
6 
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Reese's attempt to attribute mal intent or bad faith to LWP's actions is misplaced and 
based upon incomplete facts. LWP kept hoping the trial court would rule on its motion to 
intervene and when it didn't, LWP had no choice but to file a motion to quash the day 
before the deposition. 
B. The Mediator did Conduct Negotiations between L WP and Mr. Reese. 
At page 11 of his opposition, Mr. Reese states, "Mr. Felt, the mediator, was not 
involved in mediating the agreement which was made between Craig Reese and LWP." 
This is not true. LWP met with Mr. Reese and the mediator jointly at times, spoke with 
the mediator privately and spoke with the defendants and the mediator in joint sessions as 
well. Mr. Felt was actively trying to get LWP to alter its position so as to facilitate a 
settlement. Mr. Reese is yet again mistaken on this fact. Also noteworthy is that LWP 
was included in the Memorandum of Understanding from the mediator. If LWP was not 
a party to the mediation, it would not have been included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding drafted by the mediator. 
C. L WP did not Change its Mind Because No Agreement was Ever Reached. 
Mr. Reese also misstates the facts when he claims that LWP "changed its mind" 
about an agreement. Without waiving any confidentiality about the mediation 
discussions, Mr. Reese is mistaken in his belief that LWP agreed to waive the 
requirement that he exhaust funds from other sources prior to LWP resuming its 
obligation to continue making medical payments to Mr. Reese. This term was never 
discussed between the parties. R126-131. 
7 
\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After lengthy discussion between Mr. Reese, the mediator and Tingey (in which 
LWP did not participate), Mr. Reese's counsel exited an office and told Ms. Acosta that 
an agreement had been reached between Mr. Reese and the defendant, Tingey 
Construction. R129. Ms. Acosta called her client to discuss the settlement and its role in 
the settlement. R129. While reviewing the terms with LWP, Ms. Acosta realized that 
LWP and Mr. Reese had not discussed a central term. R129-30. Ms. Acosta 
immediately notified Mr. Reese's counsel of this fact and then refused to execute the 
Memorandum of Understanding because it contained the term to which LWP did not 
agree. R129-131. A contract was not formed between LWP and Mr. Reese because an 
essential term was not discussed and agreed to. 
D. L WP has Always Asserted that No Agreement was Reached. 
Despite Mr. Reese's claim to the contrary, LWP has always maintained that the 
parties never discussed whether Mr. Reese would be required to exhaust funds from the 
settlement before LWP's obligation to continue medical treatment would resume. R125-
131. Mr. Reese argues in his brief at page 13 that he did not know until the hearing on 
May 22, 2006 that LWP asserted that no agreement was reached between the parties and 
that he was shocked by this revelation. R213, 39:23-25; 40:18-20. This is obviously 
not true. 
In support of its opposition to Mr. Reese's motion to enforce settlement, LWP 
submitted copies of two letters between counsel. R91-93. In the letter found at R91, 
LWP informed Mr. Reese as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, it is our position that neither a memorandum of 
understanding nor a firm agreement had been reached. It is 
also our position that settlement negotiating in mediation are 
not complete and finalized until all parties agree to the final 
version of the written proposal. It is for this very reason that I 
always contact or meet with my client near the end of 
mediations to confirm that this is the agreement they intended 
to make. I do not sign any mediation summary until it is read 
to my client (or if my client is present, read together). Until 
that point, or until there is a memorandum of understanding, 
the agreement is tentative. 
R92. 
On February 1, 2006, LWP again wrote Mr. Reese. In that letter, LWP stated as 
follows: 
As I have told you before, it is my position and the position of 
my client, that no agreement was reached during the 
mediation and that we were still in negotiations when the 
mediation concluded. 
Again, no writing was executed in this case and it was only 
when the terms were being reduced to writing that I contacted 
my client for final approval and did not get such approval. 
R93-94. 
Additionally, LWP attached an affidavit of its counsel to the Opposition to the Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement. R88. In that affidavit, Ms. Acosta stated as follows: 
Prior to leaving the mediation on December 30, 2005, I 
made it clear to all involved that LWP did not agree to the 
terms of the settlement set forth in the document drafted by 
the mediator, Paul Felt. 
I refused to execute the written agreement because it 
contained a term to which LWP did not agree. I told Mr. 
Henriksen this as soon as it became clear to me that the term 
included in the document had not been agreed to by my 
client. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R88. Thus, LWP has always maintained that no agreement was reached during the 
mediation and that the agreement was not reached because one essential term—whether 
Mr. Reese would be required to exhaust—was never discussed. R93, R88. LWP has 
always maintained that the parties were still in the process of negotiation when LWP's 
counsel left the mediation. R93. LWP has always maintained that the parties never 
agreed to waive its right to have Mr. Reese exhaust all funds collected prior to resuming 
payment of his medical bills because this term was never discussed between LWP and 
Mr. Reese. R88. 
However, as LWP has argued at length in its introductory brief, it is in error for 
the trial court (and this Court) to engage in this type of fact discovery and analysis. The 
discussions in mediation are confidential. The rules relating to mediation require that any 
agreement reached during mediation be reduced to writing so as to preclude Courts from 
requiring evidentiary hearings so as to prove alleged oral agreement allegedly reached 
during mediation. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Ms. Acosta 
be deposed and its ruling should be reversed and the sanctity of mediations maintained. 
E. Ms. Acosta Stayed at the Mediation to Negotiate A Settlement and for No 
Other Purpose. 
Next, Mr. Reese argues at page 13 of his brief that "Ms. Acosta remained in Craig 
Reese's Counsel's office for close to an hour during which she spoke with her client by 
phone and explained to LWP that she had already made the offer several times and Craig 
Reese had accepted it and relied upon it." First, Mr. Reese's counsel was not privy to 
attorney-client privileged communication between Ms. Acosta and LWP and he is only 
10 
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speculating as to what was said between Ms. Acosta and her client. R131. Ms. Acosta 
remained at the mediation for her own purposes and Ms. Acosta is not required to reveal 
her reasoning which is protected by attorney-client privilege and is attorney work-
product. Mr. Henriksen's speculation and conjecture is not evidence. 
If Mr. Henriksen intends to offer his own testimony on this point, then upon 
remand he should be disqualified as counsel in this case and LWP should be granted 
leave to depose him and conduct further discovery into this matter. LWP recognizes the 
unprecedented nature of this request and makes it only to highlight the ludicrous nature of 
Mr. Reese's position. If oral agreements allegedly reached during mediation were 
enforceable, then proceedings such as the one at bar where attorneys and mediators are 
forced to appear as witnesses in violation of their respective oaths and ethical canons 
would become commonplace. This Court should adopt the reasoning of the cases from 
other jurisdictions cited by LWP in its opening brief and should adopt the reasoning of 
the Utah Model Mediation Act (Utah Code § 78-7 lc-101 et seq.) and find that all 
agreements reached during mediation must be reduced to writing so as to avoid the 
breach of mediation confidentiality.3 
At page 17 of his opposition, Mr. Reese asks that this "court. . . affirm the trial court's 
order with the specific instruction of allowing Craig Reese to depose Ms. Acosta and 
offer evidence to establish the existence of an agreement." Yet again, Mr. Reese ignores 
the dangers in this request. He does not ask for direction regarding the scope of such 
deposition, whether attorney-client privilege communications must be revealed, whether 
LWP can depose the other attorneys in the suit etc. Mr. Reese turns a blind eye to the 
obvious difficulty and problems with his request. LWP identifies these deficiencies to 
highlight yet again the unreasonableness of a rule, which would allow disputed oral 
agreements reached during mediation to be enforced. The bright-line rule that all 
11 
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F. LWP did not Waive its Objections by Agreeing to Let Mr. Reese File his 
Motion in the Underlying Case. 
At page 33 of his Opposition, Mr. Reese asserts that the parties "stipulated that the 
district court could hear and determine the matter to enforce the settlement agreement." 
One again, Mr. Reese omits relevant facts which put his statement into context. 
Prior to Mr. Reese filing his Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Mr. Reese 
inquired if LWP would object to his filing the motion within the confines ofthe existing 
case. LWP, as a professional courtesy and so as to facilitate the more rapid review ofthe 
issue, agreed that the motion to enforce could be filed in the same action. However, by 
letter, LWP informed Mr. Reese that it was not waiving any objections to the 
enforcement proceedings. R93. 
Had LWP known that the trial court would order its counsel deposed prior to allowing 
it to intervene in the suit and that Mr. Reese himself would oppose a motion to intervene, 
LWP would not have extended Mr. Reese this professional courtesy, for Mr. Reese has 
demonstrated LWP no reciprocal courtesy. LWP's ^reement that the motion to enforce 
could be brought within the confines of the underlying litigation is not a waiver of its 
right to object to the motion to enforce nor a waiver of its right to intervene. 
G. LWP Discussed The Mediation Only Out of Necessity to Preserve its Rights 
and Because it was Forced to do so by Mr. Reese. 
Hypocritically, Mr. Reese attacks LWP at page 33 and 34 of his Opposition for 
revealing details about "the mediation and agreement." Mr. Reese himself (despite 
mediation agreements be reduced to writing is the better reasoned and most workable 
rule. 
10 
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denying it elsewhere) admits that LWP was involved in the mediation when he makes 
this claim. But most importantly, it is unbelievable that Mr. Reese chastised LWP for 
disclosing confidential information when it did so only because it was forced to do so by 
Mr. Reese. 
At the May 22, 2006 hearing, LWP presented the court with an affidavit from 
LWP's counsel. R126. LWP made it very clear at the hearing that it only did so at the 
trial court's "insistence." R213, 29:7-10. At every turn, LWP has tried to preserve the 
confidentiality of the mediation proceeding, but has been forced by Mr. Reese to push the 
envelope on the point and reveal more and more information. That Mr. Reese would 
criticize LWP for its behavior is quite amazing and is the classic case where a party 
creates an error and then complains about it. See State v. Alfatlawi, P.3d (Utah 
App. 2006), 2006 WL 3742123 (noting that the invited error doctrine prevented a party 
from profiting from error which it assisted in creating). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 
78-31B-8 WHEN IT ORDERED LWP'S COUNSEL BE DEPOSED. 
At page 27 of his brief, Mr. Reese argues that "LWP has grossly mis-characterized the 
district court" by saying that it ruled "that settlement discussions made during the course 
of a mediation were not confidential and could be admitted into evidence." The trial 
court's ruling states that "Mediation discussions contain both 'confidential' and 'non-
confidential' discussions." R179. In no uncertain terms the trial court ruled that certain 
discussions made during the course of mediation were non-confidential. R179. Also, at 
no time prior to the ruling by the trial court has any court in the state of Utah ever held 
13 
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that there were confidential and non-confidential components to mediation. The 
established rule of law in Utah since this Court's ruling in Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 
1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), has been that all mediations are confidential. Period. 
Accordingly, LWP's summary of the trial court's ruling is hardly a "g*oss mis-
characterization" of the trial court's holding. 
Mr. Reese goes on to argue that the trial court "properly rules that evidence 
concerning a separate agreement made between LWP, a non-party to the mediation, and 
Craig Reese during and mediation between Craig Reese and Tingey were not confidential 
. . . ." See page 27 of Mr. Reese's Opposition. At no time did the trial court ever make 
any finding that LWP was not a party or participant to the mediation; that LWP and Mr. 
Reese were negotiating outside the confines of mediation; or anything of this sort. It is 
Mr. Reese who is mis-characterizing the trial court's ruling, not LWP. 
Even though Mr. Reese adamantly (and for the first time on appeal) argues that 
LWP was not a participant to the mediation of this dispute, he relies upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31b-8(4) (a statute which addresses only mediation) to support his argument. 
See Opposition at page 27. Mr. Reese argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-8(4) allows 
parties and the neutral to agree that a mediation can be non-confidential. Mr. Reese 
incorrectly limits the statute to parties to the litigation when the plain language provides 
that it is the parties to the mediation (of which LWP was a party) must agree. 
Here, as a party to the mediation, LWP does not agree to waive confidentiality of 
this mediation. According to § 78-31b-8(4), if LWP does not agree to waive 
confidentiality then it cannot be waived. Thus, § 78-31b-8(4) support's LWP's argument 
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that all mediation discussions are confidential and cannot be revealed to third parties. 
Mr. Reese's attempt to alter the meaning of the statute so as to provide him with a basis 
for breaching the confidentiality of the mediation discussion is an incorrect reading of the 
statute and is not supported by any case law or rules of statutory construction. 
What is clear again and again is that Mr. Reese cannot overcome the fact that it is 
common knowledge that when a party is asked to participate in a mediation (even if their 
role is that of a lien holder) that party gets the benefits and the limitations of the 
mediation process. No matter how hard Mr. Reese struggles to exempt himself from 
this, he cannot succeed. LWP participated in a mediation. As a participant to a 
mediation, it is entitled to the benefits of confidentiality. See Utah Code § 78-31b-8(4). 
At page 30 of his opposition, Mr. Reese cites three Utah court cases for the 
proposition that Utah Courts often reveal the terms of settlement agreements in published 
opinions. The cases relied upon by Mr. Reese are not persuasive and should be 
disregarded by the court for none of them involves agreements reached during the 
confines of mediation. 
At page 35 of his Opposition, Mr. Reese states that "the district court did not even 
order Ms. Acosta to be deposed about confidential matters. The trial court determined 
that the separate agreement was a different issue than the issue of liability between 
Tingey and Craig Reese." Mr. Reese argues that since the trial court only requires Ms ( 
Acosta to testify about "non-confidential" portions of the mediation, § 78-3 lb-8 is not 
violated. 
i 
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This argument begs the question of which portions of the mediation would be 
considered confidential and which would not be considered confidential. The trial court 
has issued a ruling, which if enforced by the Court, would require subsequent litigation of 
every mediation that did not result in a written agreement. Suddenly, every time one 
participated in a mediation and an agreement was not reached, there would be a chance 
that things you said during the course of the mediation could be used against you. 
This would have a chilling effect on all mediations. The better approach is the 
bright-lined approach of the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, Utah Code § 78-3 lb-8, and 
the reasoning of Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), which preserves 
confidentiality. Similarly, the courts in Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind. 
2000), In re Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000), and 
Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County 788 A.2d 536 (Del. Ch. 2001), each 
have found that the most reasonable approach is to require that agreements reached 
during mediation be reduced to writing. If an "exception" to the confidentiality rules is 
made in circumstances when a party wishes to enforce an oral agreement, it would surely 
become an instance where the exception would swallow the rule. See Vernon, 732 
N.E.2d at 809 (noting that an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow 
the rule). 
LWP asks this Court to adopt the reasoning of those authorities that hold that any 
agreement reached during the course of a mediation must be reduced to writing to be 
enforceable. If this Court were to enforce alleged oral agreements then there is a fear 
1£ 
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that the precepts of confidentiality— which are the cornerstone of mediation-would be 
unrecognizably eroded. 
IV. MR. REESE'S ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH CASE LAW RELIED 
UPON BY LWP FAILS. 
Mr. Reese attempts to distinguish the case law LWP relies upon in its appellate 
brief, but fails. 
A. The Principles in Lyons v. Booker Apply to this Case, 
Mr. Reese takes considerable effort to distinguish the court's ruling in Lyons v. 
Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Mr. Reeseargues that Lyons is 
distinguishable because (1) the court ordered mediation in that case and (2) the rules of 
appellate mediation specifically state that mediation is confidential. Mr. Reese's attempt 
to distinguish himself from Lyons fails. 
LWP acknowledges that Lyons v. Booker dealt specifically with appellate 
mediation but doubts that the Court intended its importance to be limited only to 
appellate mediation. The pronouncement by the court in Lyons that mediation 
discussions were confidential was not specifically limited to appellate mediation and the 
language therein is broad enough to encompass all types of mediation. 
Also, the parties here voluntarily agreed to mediation this dispute. At the joint 
opening session the mediator advised the parties that the rules of mediation applied. 
Unfortunately, because Mr. Reese did not raise his claim that LWP was not a participant 
in the mediation at the trial court level, LWP was deprived of its right to introduce 
evidence on this point. But it is important to note that Mr. Reese has not introduced any 
17 
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evidence, which proves that the parties did not intend the rules of confidentiality provided 
by statute and court rule to apply to the mediation of the dispute. 
B. The Utah Uniform Mediation Act Support's LWP's Claim of 
Confidentiality. 
Furthermore, this Court need not rely solely upon Lyons to find that the mediation 
between LWP and Mr. Reese was confidential. Effective May 1, 2006, the Utah 
Legislature adopted the Uniform Mediation Act, Utah Code § 78-3 lc-101 (2006) et seq. 
While the mediation between LWP and Mr. Reese occurred prior to the effective date of 
the Act, section 78-3 lc-114 of the Act notes that after May 1, 2007, only 4 months away, 
the Uniform Mediation Act applies to all mediation agreements, no matter when entered. 
Thus, by the mere passage of time, the Act will apply to the mediation between Mr. 
Reese and LWP and will provide LWP with the confidentiality to which it is required 
without reliance on Lyons. 
Also relevant is that § 78-31c-104 plainly states that any "participant" to a 
mediation is entitled to confidentiality and that any participant can require that others 
who are participants to the mediation maintain such confidentiality as well. See id. ; see 
also, Karen Hobbs, Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements: Deal or no 
Deal? (2006), http://www.hobbsmediation.com/pgl2.cfrru See also Addendum at page 
24. 
C. The Cases Relied Upon by Mr. Reese to Argue that Oral Mediation 
Agreements Can be Enforced are Distinguishable. 
Mr. Reese relies upon the case of Catamount Slat Prod. Inc. v. Sheldon, 845 A.2d 
324, 331 (Vt. 2003), for the proposition that parties may rely upon oral contracts even if 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they intend to memorialize into written document. Opposition at page 37. However, Mr. 
Reese fails to state that in Catamount the court also found as follows: "On the other 
hand, if either party communicates an intent not to be bound until he achieves a fully 
executed document, no amount of negotiation or oral agreement to specific terms will 
result in the formation of a binding contract." Id. at 329. In that case, the court found 
that the parties did not intend to be bound until the execution of a written document. 
The same is true here. Ms. Acosta called LWP to discuss the final terms of the 
agreement when she was handed the written Memorandum of Understanding. R126-131. 
Her actions alone illustrate that LWP did not intend to be bound until the terms of the 
written agreement were reviewed with LWP. 
This is the same reasoning set forth in the case of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan 
of Northwest v. Doe, 903 P.2d 375 (Or.App. 1995). Mr. Reese cites this case claiming 
that the court in Kaiser found that an oral agreement reached during mediation was 
enforceable. What Mr. Reese fails to advise this Court is that the plaintiffs' attorney in 
that case executed a written document at the conclusion of the mediation which 
memorialized the essential terms of the agreement. See id. at 379. The plaintiff only 
refused to execute the more-lengthy, subsequent document. See id. The trial court in that 
case could litigate the terms of the settlement without delving into the confidentiality of 
the mediation because the material terms of the agreement had been reduced to writing. 
See id. 
The case at bar is distinguishable. Here, prior to leaving the mediation, LWP 
refused to execute any written document on the ground that no agreement had been 
19 
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reached. R126. LWP advised all involved that the Memorandum of Understanding 
included a term to which LWP did not agree. R88, 126. There is no way to determine 
whether an oral agreement was reached by the parties without breaching the 
confidentiality of the mediation process. 
Mr. Reese also relies upon the case of Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802 (W. 
Va 2002). That case is also distinguishable. There, post-mediation, the mediator 
negotiated a settlement over the phone and reduced it to writing. See id at 804. The 
mediator and one of the parties executed the document and forwarded it to the other 
parties. See id at 804-05. The second party did not sign the document but drafted its own 
document and asked that the others execute his document which included additional 
terms. See id at 805. When the parties declined to execute the new document, the 
parties brought suit to enforce the settlement agreement. See id. 
The facts of Riner are quite different from the facts here. Even though the second 
party refused to execute the document proposed to it by the first party, the second party 
did execute some form of writing. The court enforced the agreement to the extent the 
terms of the two documents matched. See id at 809. Also important is that neither party 
raised the issue of confidentiality. See id. 
Thus, the cases relied upon by Mr. Reese to support his claim that the trial court 
properly ordered LWP to produce its counsel for deposition have facts which are very 
different from the case at bar. This Court should follow the cases proposed by LWP as 
they are more closely on point. 
90 
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V. LWP's RELIANCE ON CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE COURT. 
It should be noted that Mr. Reese fails to distinguish much of the case law 
relied upon by LWP in its opening brief and this should be taken as an admission 
that LWP's assertion of the holdings and application of such law is accurate. 
Mr. Reese has capitulated on these points. 
Mr. Reese weakly attempts to distinguish Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 8005 
(Ind. 2000), Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County 788 A.2d 536 (Del. Ch. 
2001), and Ryan v.Garcia 33 Cal.Rpt.2d 158, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), by reviving his 
argument that LWP and Mr. Reese were not "in a mediation" and argues that, as a 
consequence, the reasoning in these cases do not apply. As stated before, this argument 
was not preserved below. Moreover, it is inaccurate. LWP attended and participated in 
the mediation. It is entitled to the benefits and burdens of mediation. 
Mr. Reese does not attack LWP's account of Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 
745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that for federal mediation program to work "participants 
must trust that matters discussed at a conference will not be revealed to the judges."); In 
re Acceptance Insurance Company 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000)(where the 
court entertained a writ of mandamus to address the error of allowing parties to testify at 
trial regarding confidential mediation discussions). Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 
1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Where agreement within confines of mediation was enforced 
because the mediator had taken handwritten notes and the parties signed these notes in 
lieu of a more formal document, but still requiring some form of writing that "contain the 
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terms to which the parties agreed".); Spencer v. Spencer, 72 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001) (where agreement within confines of mediation was dictated by the mediator at the 
end of the mediation but one party thought she would be given the chance to review this 
dictation prior to signature was found not enforceable until it had been signed by the 
parties); Regents of the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that oral discussion after mediation had concluded was not 
subject to the same confidentiality protections as statements within mediation). 
As the court in Ryan, supra, held: "Judicial sifting of statements made at a 
confidential mediation to select those which can be used as evidence of an agreement 
contravenes the legislative intent underlying adoption [of ADR rules and] . . . undercuts 
the effect of the statute intended by the Legislature." 33 Cal. Rpt.2d 158 at 161. Most 
importantly, the court in Ryan noted that if oral mediation settlements were enforceable, 
it would be "costly and time-consuming." IcL at 162. Allowing for oral mediation 
settlement "permits full-blown trials to determine, in each mediation case, if there was an 
oral agreement and, if so, on what terms." Id 
VI. CONCLUSION 
LWP respectfully requests that the trial court be reversed and that this matter be 
remanded to the trial court with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be 
dismissed with prejudice for lack of admissible evidence in support thereof. 
?.? 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this l&_ day of January 2007. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
TIM DALTON DUNN, Esq. 
S. GRACE ACOSTA, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for LWP Solutions, Inc. 
64-
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X. ADDENDUM 
Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements: 
Deal or No Deal? 
Karin S. Hobbs, Attorney/Mediator 
After hours of mediation, the parties have reached a "deal" on the principal issues. The 
parties want closure. Attorneys begin preparing the written agreement to ensure the deal 
is clear, complete, final and enforceable. Confidential mediation discussions continue. 
Emotions run high as the parties work through the final issues. If the "deal" is not written 
and signed, is there an agreement? Are the discussions confidential? How do attorneys 
ensure confidentiality of mediation? How do attorneys create an enforceable settlement 
agreement and avoid court action? 
Why is confidentiality so important? Confidentiality is a critical element of successful 
mediation. In order for the mediator, the attorneys and the clients to understand the 
central issues, the motivations, the pressure points and the risks of litigation, the 
participants must be assured the discussions cannot and will not be disclosed to others so 
they can talk openly. Frequently, some of the motivating forces behind lawsuits are 
legally irrelevant and yet exceptionally important to understanding the conflict and 
facilitating resolution. Frequently, clients disclose private events, perceptions or issues in 
mediation they would not want disclosed to anyone. Explaining their concerns and fears 
is often critically important to them in order to resolve the conflict. If discussions with 
the mediator are not confidential and privileged, the mediation process, the mediator's 
role and the potential for resolution are significantly diminished. 
In preparing for mediation, attorneys explain to clients that mediation is confidential. 
"These are settlement discussions and cannot be disclosed in court," attorneys tell their 
clients. "You can feel free to talk to the mediator. She won't disclose it to the other side 
if you tell her the information is confidential." In the opening session of the mediation 
conference, the mediator explains that the discussions are confidential and privileged. 
All participants sign an Agreement to Mediate stating they understand the mediation 
process, the mediator's role and the confidentiality of the discussions. Mediation 
proceeds based on an understanding that the mediation discussions are confidential. 
Despite mediation confidentiality, courts are increasingly asked to enforce settlement 
agreements reached in mediation jeopardizing confidential mediation discussions.4 
4
 Simmons v. Ghaderl 143 Cal. App. 4th 410 (Cal App. 2d Dist.) (2006). 
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Confidentiality and privilege, two different yet intertwined concepts, are often used 
interchangeably. Confidentiality means the mediation communications are not disclosed. 
The mediation privilege is a rule providing that the confidential communications are not 
admissible in court. Utah recently enacted the Uniform Mediation Act articulating 
guidelines for mediation privilege and mediation confidentiality. Attorneys can take 
steps to plan for and create enforceable settlement agreements to ensure that the process 
remains confidential and privileged. 
1. The Uniform Mediation Act 
a. Mediation Communications 
On May 1, 2006, Utah became the eighth state to adopt the Uniform Mediation Act 
(UMA).5 The Uniform Mediation act defines mediation communication as "conduct or a 
statement, whether oral, in a record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation 
or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, 
continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3 lc-102(2) (2006). Thus, discussions with a mediator before, during or as a continuation 
of the mediation discussions are both confidential and privileged under the Uniform 
Mediation Act. When the mediator meets with the attorney and client before mediation 
or in a follow-up meeting, the protections of confidentiality and privilege continue to 
apply. 
b. Mediation Confidentiality 
i. Prior to the Uniform Mediation Act 
Even prior to the creation of the Uniform Mediation Act, courts throughout the country 
recognized mediation confidentiality as essential to effective mediation because it allows 
a candid and informal exchange of information.6 "The process works best when parties 
speak with complete candor, acknowledge weaknesses, and seek common ground, 
without fear that, if a settlement is not achieved, their words will later be used against 
5
 Utah joins Washington D.C., Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and 
Washington. Vermont was the ninth state to adopt the UMA, and the UMA is pending in 
four states: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Minnesota. 
6
 Foxgate Homeowners Association v. Bramalea California, Inc., 26 Cal.4thl,14 (Cal. 
2001); Sharp, D., Mediation Confidentiality, AAA Handbook on Mediation (2006). 
Hoffman, D. and Shemin V., The Uniform Mediation Act: Upgrading Confidentiality in 
Mediation, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, July 18, 2005. 
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n 
them in the more traditionally adversarial litigation process." Courts agree that "[w]hat 
is said and done during the mediation process will remain confidential, unless there is an 
express waiver by all parties or unless the need for disclosure is so great that it 
substantially outweighs the need for confidentiality."8 Further, "[t]he mediation process 
was not designed to create another layer of litigation in an already over-burdened 
system."9 
ii. Confidentiality under the Uniform Mediation Act 
The Uniform Mediation Act, finalized in 2003, solidifies and reinforces mediation 
confidentiality. Mediation confidentiality, according to the drafters of the Uniform 
Mediation Act, encourages parties to have an informal and candid exchange of ideas.10 
Frank discussions are essential to opening constructive and creative dialogue and to 
enabling parties to discover ways to resolve their disputes independent of the judicial 
system. x According to the Act, "[t]his frank exchange can be achieved only if the 
participants know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their detriment 
through later court proceedings and adjudicatory processes."12 
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act specifies that mediation communications are 
"confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this 
state" unless subject to the open and public meetings statutes or government access to 
records laws. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-108 (2006). Thus, the act provides for a general 
protective umbrella of confidentiality over mediation communications. 
iii. Confidentiality Rules and Statutes in Utah 
Utah's Alternative Dispute Resolution Act also provides that "[u]nless all parties and the 
neutral agree, no person attending an ADR proceeding . . . may disclose or be required to 
disclose any information obtained in the court of an ADR proceeding, including any 
memoranda, notes, records, or work product." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8(4). Further, 
"an ADR provider . . . may not disclose or be required to disclose any information about 
any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the proceeding . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-
8(5). 
7
 Princeton Ins. Co. v Court of Chancery of Delaware, 883 A.2d 44, 51 (Del. 2005); see 
also, Foxgate Homeowners Association v. Bramalea California, Inc. 26 Cal.4thl,14 (Cal. 
2001). 
8
 Lehr v. Afflitto, 382 N.J. Super. 376, 391, 889 A.2d 462, 472 (N.J. 2006). 
9Id. 
10
 Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version with prefatory remarks, National Conference on 
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (2003). 
11
 w. 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further, the Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution provides "[mjotions, 
memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, and other written, oral or other communication 
submitted . . . to the ADR provider . . . shall be confidential and shall not be made a part 
of the record or filed with the clerk of the court. Neither shall any such communication 
be transmitted to the judge to whom the case is assigned . . . ,"13 The ADR provider 
"shall not disclose to or discuss with anyone, including the assigned judge, any 
information about or related to the proceedings, unless specifically provided otherwise in 
these rules. ADR providers shall secure and ensure the confidentiality of ADR 
proceeding records."14 
Rule 4-510 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration also states that "No ADR 
provider may be required to testify as to any aspect of an ADR proceeding except as to 
any claim of violation of URCADR Rule 104 which raises a substantial question as to the 
impartiality of the ADR provider and the conduct of the ADR proceeding involved." 
Thus, the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, Utah's Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, the 
Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration all provide that mediation discussions are not to be disclosed to others. In 
one narrowly drawn Utah appellate case, the Utah Court of Appeals enforced the 
confidentiality of court-ordered appellate mediation stating that counsel, the parties, and 
the mediator could not disclose any statements, comments, or notes made during the 
initial mediation conference or in related discussions.15 
Mediation confidentiality is more expansive than confidentiality in other professional 
relationships. In many professional relationships, the duty of confidentiality, such as the 
attorney/client relationship and the physician/patient relationship, the obligation restricts 
the professional only and not the client or patient.16 For example, in the attorney/client 
relationship, the client is free to disclose conversations with the attorney, whereas the 
attorney is prohibited from doing so.17 However, mediation is different. In mediation, the 
duty to maintain confidentiality extends to all participants from all participants, 
including third-parties, "to the extent agreed to by the parties or provided by other law or 
rule of this state." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31c-108 (2006). The Utah Uniform Mediation 
Act specifically allows third party involvement in mediation and allows third-parties the 
protection of mediation confidentiality and the mediation privilege. 
c. Mediation Privilege 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
14
 w. 
15
 Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1999). 
16
 Utah R. Evid 506(c); DeBrv v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Utah 2000). 
17
 Rule 1.12 Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
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So, how does the mediation privilege mesh with mediation confidentiality? Confidential 
mediation communications, under Utah evidentiary law, are settlement discussions under 
1 O 
the federal and state rules of evidence and are not disclosed in court. The Uniform 
Mediation Act specifically provides for a mediation privilege and articulates waivers of 
the privilege and exceptions to the privilege. For example, in the medical profession, 
patient records are confidential; however the physician/patient privilege regulates 
whether the information can be admitted as evidence in court. Similarly, mediation 
communications are confidential, and the privilege governs admission of the confidential 
information in court. 
d. Waiver of the Privilege 
How can the privilege be waived, thus allowing the mediation communications to be 
admitted as evidence in a proceeding? The Uniform Mediation Act provides that the 
mediation privilege may be waived in a record or orally during a proceeding if it is 
expressly waived by all parties to the mediation and is expressly waived by the mediator 
and by the third party participants. Thus, in order to waive the privilege, everyone 
involved in the mediation must waive the privilege in a record or in a proceeding. 
The Act further states that a person may be precluded from asserting the privilege if a 
person discloses or makes a representation about a mediation that prejudices another 
person in a proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-105(2) (2006). Thus, attorneys, 
clients, mediators and third-party participants in mediation should be forewarned that 
they may waive the privilege if they make a statement about mediation communications. 
For example, if a client takes confidential mediation discussions to the media and the 
disclosure prejudices the other side, the privilege may be waived. If the privilege is 
waived, it is only waived to the extent necessary for the person to respond to the 
representation or disclosure. 
All mediation participants should be on notice that disclosure of confidential information 
may leave a crack open in a door they wanted sealed shut. For example, if a mediation 
participant learns confidential information during mediation, disclosure of that 
information may give rise to a lawsuit for breach of contract, i.e., the mediation 
agreement. If damages are proven, a plaintiff may prevail on the breach of a 
confidentiality provision in a mediation agreement. All mediation participants should 
understand that breaching the Agreement to Mediate and mediation confidentiality can 
lead to future problems and potential lawsuits. 
e. Exceptions to the Privilege 
Utah R. Evid. 408; Fed. R. Evid. 408. 
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The Act also provides exceptions to the mediation privilege. Prior to the Uniform 
Mediation Act, case law developed exceptions to the mediation privilege. In 1999, 
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil jolted the mediation community when he ordered a 
mediator to testify.19 In Olam, a woman participated in mediation late into the night and 
signed an agreement. She then moved to set aside the agreement, claiming that she was 
physically, intellectually and emotionally incapable of giving consent. The court held that 
the best evidence of her capacity to consent was testimony from the mediator. After both 
parties waived their right to maintain the confidentiality of the mediation 
communications, but the mediator did not waive confidentiality, Judge Brazil ordered the 
mediator to testify in a sealed proceeding. Judge Brazil reasoned that the public interest 
in disclosing the confidential mediation discussions outweighed the interest in 
confidentiality. Although this case has been distinguished due to the parties' waiver of 
confidentiality, the case created great concern among the mediation community and is 
often cited for the proposition that the interest in confidentiality may be weighed against 
the public interest in disclosing the confidential information.20 
Mediation confidentiality has also been deemed waived when an attorney failed to object 
1 1 
to admission of or evidence of events occurring in mediation. In addition, a juvenile's 
significant constitutional right to a defense has been held to outweigh mediation 
confidentiality. 
Prior to May 1, 2006, attorneys relied on the evidentiary rule that evidence of conduct or 
statements made in compromise negotiations is not admissible. The Utah Uniform 
Mediation Act creates a specific mediation privilege and extends it to the parties, the 
mediator and third-party participants. The mediation communication is not privileged if 
the mediation communication is demonstrated "in an agreement evidenced by a record 
signed by all parties to the agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(l) (2006). Thus, 
if all parties sign an agreement, that agreement is not privileged. In addition, there is no 
privilege if the mediation communication is available to the public under the public 
meeting laws or if a threat is made to inflict bodily injury or to commit a crime of 
violence. Also, the Act states there is no mediation privilege if the mediation 
communication is used to plan a crime or if it is sought or offered to prove or disprove a 
iy
 Olam v. Congress Mortgage Company, 68 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
20
 Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 351 (2003) (participants to mediation 
cannot impliedly waive their confidentiality rights by challenging the agreement reached 
in mediation.) 
21
 Regents of University of California v. Sumner 42 Cal. App.4th1209 (1996). 
22
 Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.4th 155 (Cal. 1998) (Prior inconsistent 
statements made by a witness at mediation may be introduced at a subsequent 
delinquency hearing.). 
23
 Utah R. Evid. 408. The Utah rule is identical to Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
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claim or complaint of professional malpractice. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(1 )(b) -
(e) (2006). 
Finally, the Utah Uniform Mediation Act states that mediation communications are not 
privileged if "there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in 
protecting confidentiality." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-l'06(2)(b) (2006). To qualify 
under this provision, the mediation communications must not otherwise be available and 
the communication must be sought or offered either in a felony or misdemeanor 
proceeding or in a proceeding regarding a contract arising out of mediation. Thus, if 
one of the parties seeks to enforce a mediation agreement, the court may find no 
mediation privilege if a more important countervailing public interest is involved, the 
evidence it not otherwise available and the communication is sought in an action to 
enforce a mediated agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-106(2) (2006) 
2. Practical Steps to Maintain Confidentiality and Avoid Court Action 
a. Prepare Settlement Agreement in Advance of Mediation 
Mediation has expanded enormously. As a result, actions to enforce mediated 
agreements are becoming more common. Although the Uniform Mediation Act and other 
rules offer a veil of confidentiality, what practical steps can attorneys take to avoid court 
action and preserve confidentiality? 
Prior to the mediation conference, attorneys should envision standard provisions of a 
settlement agreement. Attorneys can either arrive at the mediation conference with a 
laptop computer, a partially drafted settlement agreement or prepared staff members 
standing by to compose and/or email documents to the mediation. Clients are also 
excellent sources of this preparation, as they often identify unknown and important terms. 
b. Create and sign a written agreement in mediation 
At the close of the mediation conference, attorneys and clients should create and sign a 
written agreement addressing all essential terms, if possible. Additional time spent in 
mediation drafting and signing the settlement agreement, while everyone is focused on 
settling the case, will significantly reduce the most common reason to explore 
confidential mediation communications. How can you accomplish this effectively at the 
end of a long day when the participants are exhausted? What if a party voices a desire to 
prepare the agreement the following day or a desire to "sleep on it." At this point, the 
clients and attorneys are required to think about the benefits of closure versus the risk the 
agreement may fall apart. Both options are available. If a signed agreement is not 
possible due to lack of information, insufficient time or complexity of the issues, the 
parties may want to continue the process. If enough of the information is available, 
10 
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continuing the process is generally not helpful. However, some cases require more than 
one or two mediation sessions. In addition, attorneys should clarify for clients the impact 
of leaving the mediation without signing an agreement, the loss of momentum, and 
whether either party will be held to any statements made during the mediation process. 
Momentum is another consideration. At the end of the negotiation, parties have 
momentum and are more likely to concede on minor issues. 
c. Desire for Finality vs. Reluctance to Enter an Agreement 
Finalizing the agreement in writing is the final stage of the mediation process. 
Momentum is often lost if the parties leave mediation without an agreement. Frequently, 
if an agreement is not signed on the day of mediation, one party retracts the agreement. 
Attorneys and clients can prepare for this tension of reluctance to enter an agreement 
versus desire for finality by understanding this tension exists and knowing this tension is 
a common final step in resolving conflict. Mediators and attorneys can facilitate closure. 
As the agreement is prepared, food can be delivered, rejuvenating the participants. 
Clients can take a walk around the block, check their email or run an errand. Just the 
brief break assists the parties in clearing their minds and preparing to sign the final 
agreement. 
d. Standard Provisions in Settlement Agreements 
Standard provisions in settlement agreements include releases of liability, resolution of 
all claims and defenses, dismissal of lawsuits, timelines and security for payments, 
confidentiality clauses, cooperation in preparing documents necessary to effectuate the 
agreement, and payment of attorney fees. The parties may want their agreement to state 
that in the event of a dispute regarding the agreement, they will return to mediation prior 
to initiating court action. As with all other provisions of the agreement, this provision 
could be negotiated, including the process to be used, the allocation of costs and other 
terms that serves the parties interest in resolving the dispute and avoiding the litigation 
process. To avoid claims of duress, agreements should also state that the parties enter the 
agreement freely, voluntarily, without duress or coercion and with the advice of counsel. 
i 
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Standard Settlement Agreement 
Provisions: 
• Mutual releases of liability 
• Dismissal of lawsuit(s) 
• Timelines for payments, interest, 
security, liens 
• Confidentiality clauses 
• Cooperation in preparing 
documents necessary to effectuate 
agreement 
• Payment of attorney fees 
• Resolution of all claims and 
defenses 
• Dispute resolution clauses, i.e., 
mediation, arbitration, allocation 
of costs 
• Agreement entered freely, 
voluntarily, without duress or 
coercion and with the advice of 
counsel 
e. Achieving Closure 
The goal of the mediation process is to empower parties with information and a process 
for solving their own issues by mutual agreement without court intervention. If the 
process produces another layer of litigation, the mediation process will suffer and parties 
will hesitate to engage in frank and productive settlement discussions. After the 
agreement is signed, the clients generally feel relief. They have compromised more than 
they wanted but are relieved the conflict is resolved. Carefully crafted settlement 
agreements insulate the parties from court action, and allow parties to resolve the 
conflict, move on and focus their emotions and energy on other more positive aspects of 
their lives. 
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UTAH UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT 
78-31c-101. Title, 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Mediation Act." 
78-31c-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and 
negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding 
their dispute. 
(2) "Mediation communication" means conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a 
record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of 
considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a 
mediation or retaining a mediator. 
(3) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation and whose 
agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute. 
(4) "Mediator" means an individual who is neutral and conducts a mediation. 
(5) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or mediator, that 
participates in a mediation. 
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, partnership, 
limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental 
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or 
commercial entity. 
(7) "Proceeding" means: 
(a) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related 
prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or 
(b) a legislative hearing or similar process. 
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
(9) "Sign" means: 
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a 
record; or 
(b) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with a 
record with the present intent to authenticate a record. 
78-31c-103. Scope. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2) or (3), this chapter applies to a 
mediation in which: 
(a) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute, court, or administrative 
agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator; 
(b) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that 
demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against 
disclosure; or 
(c) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or herself 
out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by an entity that holds itself out as 
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providing mediation. 
(2) The chapter does not apply to a mediation: 
(a) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a 
collective bargaining relationship; 
(b) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes established by 
a collective bargaining agreement, except that the chapter applies to a mediation arising 
out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court; 
(c) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or 
(d) conducted under the auspices of: 
(i) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students; or 
(ii) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that institution. 
(3) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects 
agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges 
under Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 do not apply to the mediation or part 
agreed upon. However, Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 apply to a mediation 
communication made by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement 
before the communication is made. 
78-31c-104. Privilege against disclosure — Admissibility — Discovery. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-31c-106, a mediation communication 
is privileged as provided in Subsection (2) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in 
evidence in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as provided by Section 78-31c-105. 
(2) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply: 
(a) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from 
disclosing, a mediation communication. 
(b) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent 
any other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator. 
(c) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person 
from disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant. 
(3) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does 
not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or 
use in a mediation. 
78-31c-105. Waiver and preclusion of privilege. 
(1) A privilege under Section 78-31c-104 may be waived in a record or orally during a 
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation, and: 
(a) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator; 
and 
(b) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the 
nonparty participant. 
(2) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation 
communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from 
asserting a privilege under Section 78-31c-104, but only to the extent necessary for the 
person prejudiced to respond to the representation or disclosure. 
(3) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit 
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a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from 
asserting a privilege under Section 78-31c-104. 
78-31c-106. Exceptions to privilege. 
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 for a mediation communication 
that is: 
(a) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement; 
(b) available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, or made during a mediation session which is open, or is required by 
law to be open, to the public; 
(c) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of 
violence; 
(d) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to 
conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity; 
(e) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional 
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator; 
(f) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or offered to prove or 
disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a 
mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct 
occurring during a mediation; or 
(g) subject to the reporting requirements in Section 62A-3-305 or 62A-4a-403. 
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 if a court, administrative agency, 
or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the 
proponent of the evidence has shown that: 
(a) the evidence is not otherwise available; 
(b) there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in 
protecting confidentiality; and 
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
(i) a court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor; or 
(ii) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a proceeding to prove a claim to 
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation. 
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation 
communication referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or (2)(c)(ii). 
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection (1) or (2), only 
the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from 
nondisclosure may be admitted. Admission of evidence under Subsection (1) or (2) does 
not render the evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or 
admissible for any other purpose. 
78-31c-107. Prohibited mediator reports. 
(1) Except as required in Subsection (2), a mediator may not make a report, 
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a 
mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on 
the dispute that is the subject of the mediation. 
(2) A mediator may disclose: 
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(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was 
reached, and attendance; 
(b) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 78-31c-106; or 
(c) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or 
exploitation of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting individuals 
against such mistreatment. 
(3) A communication made in violation of Subsection (1) may not be considered by a 
court, administrative agency, or arbitrator. 
78-31c-108. Confidentiality, 
Unless subject to Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, and Title 63, 
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, mediation 
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other 
law or rule of this state. 
78-31c-109. Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest — Background. 
(1) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a 
mediator shall: 
(a) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether 
there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the 
impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of 
the mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable 
participant in the mediation; and 
(b) disclose any known fact to the mediation parties as soon as practical before 
accepting a mediation. 
(2) If a mediator learns any fact described in Subsection (l)(a) after accepting a 
mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as practicable. 
(3) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested to serve as a 
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute. 
(4) Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge or 
ombudsman. 
(5) This chapter does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by 
background or profession. 
(6) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in 
Subsections (1) and (2) to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise. 
78-31c-110. Participation in mediation. 
An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, and 
participate in, a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the mediation may be 
rescinded. 
78-31c-lll. International commercial mediation. 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "International commercial mediation" means an international commercial 
conciliation as defined in Article 1 of the Model Law. 
(b) "Model Law" means the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 June 2002 
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and recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution 
(A/RES/57/18) dated 19 November 2002. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), if a mediation is an 
international commercial mediation, the mediation is governed by the Model Law. 
(3) Unless the parties agree in accordance with Subsection 78-31c-103(3) that all or 
part of an international commercial mediation is not privileged, Sections 78-31c-104 
through 78-31c-106 and any applicable definitions in Section 78-31c-102 of this chapter 
apply to the mediation and nothing in Article 10 of the Model Law derogates from 
Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106. 
(4) If the parties to an international commercial mediation agree under Article 1, 
Section (7), of the Model Law that the Model Law does not apply, this chapter applies. 
78-31c-112. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce 
Act 
This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, 
or supersede Section 101(c) of that act or authorize electronic delivery of any of the 
notices described in Section 103(b) of that act. 
78-31c-113. Uniformity of application and construction. 
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration should be given to the need to 
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 
78-31c-114. Application to existing agreements or referrals. 
(1) This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to mediate 
made on or after May 1, 2006. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter governs all 
agreements to mediate whenever made. 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I hereby certify that on the 
VIII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
(A* )ay of January 2007, a true and accurate copy of the 
Appellate Brief of LWP Solutions, Inc. was served by hand delivery on the following: 
Richard Henriksen 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Joseph E. Minnock 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
X) Hand Delivered 
) Overnight Mail 
) Facsimile (355-0246) 
) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
X) Hand Delivered 
) Overnight Mail 
) Facsimile 
TIM DALTON DUNN, Esq 
S. GRACE ACOSTA, Esq. 
Attorneys for LWP Solutions, Inc 
TS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
